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Identifying and Measuring Technical Inefficiency Factors: Evidence from Unbalanced
Panel Data for Thai Listed Manufacturing Enterprises
I. Introduction
In recent years, Thailand has faced a real challenge of sustaining its growth and
escaping from its “middle income trap

1

(World Bank Office -Thailand, 2008). For Thailand

to transition to higher income and growth in the long term, measures to improve productivity
and competitiveness over the long term in all sectors (agriculture, industry, and services) are
urgently needed. In particular, measures to increase productivity in the manufacturing sector,
as the main sector in Thailand accounting for 40.10 percent of Thai GDP in 2008 (Bank of
Thailand, 2009), are very important. The manufacturing sector has been one of the most
important sectors in the East and Southeast Asian countries. Economic growth in this region
since the early 1980s has arisen primarily from the rapid expansion in manufacturing exports
(Jongwanich, 2007). To analyse how best to increase Thailand’s productivity it is also
necessary to conduct a firm level analysis, since firms are the engines of economic growth. It
is crucial, therefore, to examine how firms can enhance their performance, as this has a direct
impact on the overall growth of the economy.
The major problems causing firm-level inefficiency could be obviously observed from
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The Crisis highlighted problems of lack of transparency in
corporate governance and a corrupt and mismanaged banking system (i.e., excessive lending
to non-productive assets, lack of adequate debt monitoring) among the crisis-affected
countries in South East Asia as well as Thailand. The problem of weak corporate governance
was related to, for example, the dominance of controlling shareholders, the separation of
voting and cash flow rights (or the disparity between control and ownership), and the limited
protection of minority rights (Claessens et al., 2000). Not only the inefficient environmental
factors discussed above caused manufacturing inefficiency in Thailand but firm-specific
factors (i.e., inadequate firm size, lack of business experience, lack of research and
development (R&D) investment, inefficient managerial skills, lack of internal competition,
1

Thailand moved rapidly from a low‐income country to a middle‐income country during the period between
the 1970s to mid‐1990s. This resulted from the rapid growth in per capita income during that period.
Nevertheless, in recent years, real GDP growth has slowed and is now was lower than that of other developing
countries in East Asia. With intensifying global competition and higher commodity prices, Thailand confronts a
real challenge of sustaining its growth and becoming a higher income country (World Bank Office‐Thailand,
2008, p. 2).
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and lack of external competition or lack of learning-by-exporting experience) also affected
the inefficiency performance of Thai listed manufacturing firms. After the 1997 Asian
financial crisis the corporate governance system has been strengthened in Thai capital
markets, such as through enhancing the institutional framework for accounting and auditing
practices, improving the disclosure practice of listed companies, encouraging best practices
for directors of listed companies, and relaxing foreign ownership controls (East Asia
Analytical Unit, 2000, Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005, Sally, 2007). However, these
environmental and firm-specific factors that affect firm inefficiency have not been
empirically examined for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. This paper aims to fill this
gap, and is organized as follows: Section II provides a review of the literature. Sector III
describes data sources and data classification. Section IV presents empirical models which
consist of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the two-stage data envelopment analysis
(DEA) approaches. Hypothesis tests are analysed in Section V. The empirical results of both
approaches are provided and discussed in Section VI. Implications from the results are
provided in Section VII. Some conclusions are also provided in the final section.
II. Literature Review
Very few empirical studies have examined the effect of leverage (financial
constraints) on a firm’s technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003, Sena, 2006, Mok et
al., 2007, Weill, 2008). Sena (2006) and Mok et al. (2007) used the leverage ratio represented
by the ratio of total debt to total assets (the D/A ratio) to investigate the effect of financial
constraints on firm technical efficiency. This debt ratio captures how much a firm is
constrained in its expansion. Their empirical results revealed that firms with high leverage
tend to experience a decrease in their technical efficiency. This was confirmed by Goldar et
al., (2003) who applied the quick ratio

current assets

inventory /current liabilities to

examine the importance of the liquidity of Indian engineering firms on their technical
efficiency, and found that liquidity has a significantly negative effect on firm technical
efficiency. There are a number of theoretical studies focusing on the relative efficiency of
internal versus external financing (Jensen, 1986, Gertner et al., 1994, Stein, 1997). The
conclusions from which are still controversial. Gertner et al., (1994) and Stein (1997)
supported that a firm’s capital is allocated more efficiently through internal financial
resources than external ones, since internal financing can increase monitoring incentives,
decrease entrepreneurial incentives, and have better asset redeployability. In other words,
2

internal financing improves the efficiency of investments and resource allocation. However,
Jensen (1986) argued that internal financing causes an agency problem, since managers have
the opportunity to abuse internal funds, and they can easily mobilize internal funds to
maximize their own interests and lack the desire or necessity to maximize shareholders’
interests due to the lack of external monitoring from banks or financial institutions. Empirical
studies have also revealed inconclusive results. For example, Gökçekus (1995) found no
significant effects of the relative efficiency of internal versus external financial resources on a
firm’s technical efficiency for the Turkish rubber industry. Kim (2003) used the ratio of total
interest payments on borrowed capital to total capital as a proxy for external financing. He
found that this has a positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency. Focusing on research and
development (R&D) a number of empirical studies have found that R&D has a positive effect
on a firm’s technical efficiency (Aw and Batra, 1998, Kim, 2003, Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003,
Sheu and Yang, 2005). Kim (2003) found that the ratio of R&D spending to total output has a
significant positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency for the textile and chemical
industries, but such a relationship was not found in the fabrication industry. Sheu and Yang
(2005) also found that R&D, as measured by annual R&D expenditure deflated by the
general Wholesale Price Index (WPI), positively influences technical efficiency in Taiwan’s
electronics industry.
Ownership structure is also one of the important firm-specific factors affecting a
firm’s performance. A number of empirical studies have examined the effect of controlling
ownership on a firm’s performance based on accounting or financial measures (Demsetz and
Lehn, 1985, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Leech and Leahy, 1991, Wiwattanakantang,
2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007), but their empirical results are still
inconclusive. There are both costs and benefits associated with controlling ownership. The
presence of controlling ownerships (shareholders with large stakes) can deteriorate firm
performance, since the interest of controlling shareholders may not align with those of noncontrolling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Bebchuk et al., 1999). There is a
possibility that large shareholders may conduct corrupt activities (i.e., using a firm’s cash
flows for their own benefits). On the other hand, according to agency theory, controlling
shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed shareholders, since a high level of
ownership concentration can reduce agency costs. In practice, controlling ownership can be
measured by the percentage of equity owned by the largest five shareholders
(Wiwanttanakantang, 2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007). In the case
3

of Thailand, Wiwanttanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) found that
controlling ownership is positively associated with a firm’s performance, as evaluated by
accounting or financial measures. Similarly, managerial ownership 2 can help align the
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If
managers’ interests coincide more closely with those of shareholders, the conflicts between
managers and shareholders are alleviated. A number of empirical studies have found a
positive linear and non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm
performance as measured by financial profitability (Pfeffer, 1972, Morck et al., 1988,
Wiwattanakantang, 2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003). Very few empirical studies have
examined the effect of managerial ownership on a firm’s technical efficiency (see Liao et al.
(2010)). Liao et al. (2010) calculated the percentage of equity owned by managers and the
percentage of equity owned by the board, and examined the effects of these variables on a
firm’s technical efficiency as measured by a two-stage DEA. Their results found that
managerial and board equities are positively related with a firm’s technical efficiency, but
their results are not statistically significant. In addition, very few empirical studies examined
the effect of executive remuneration on a firm’s technical efficiency. Baek and Pagán (2003)
conducted a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure a firm’s technical efficiency, and
found that the level of CEO total compensation is positively associated with a firm’s
technical efficiency for S&P 1,500 firms.
Focusing upon different types of firm ownership a number of empirical studies have
also found a positive association between foreign ownership and technical efficiency
(Fukuyama et al., 1999, Goldar et al., 2003, Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004). Empirical
studies focusing upon the relationship between family ownership and firm performance have
been examined in the finance literature, but very few studies linked family ownership with a
firm’s technical efficiency. Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) used dummy variables for
family and partnership ownership to examine the effect of family and partnership ownership
on a firm’s technical efficiency, conducted using the two-stage DEA approach. Their results
revealed a significantly negative association between family and partnership ownership and
firm technical efficiency for 280 Israeli firms. Claessens (2000) defined the controlling
shareholder (ultimate owner) by adopting cut-off shareholding levels of 10 percent and 20
percent for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korean, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan,
2

Managerial ownership is defined as being top executives (i.e., managers and board of directors) who also hold
a firm’s shares (i.e., common stocks and preferred stocks).
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and Thailand. In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantung (2001) and Yammeesri and Loadh
(2003) investigated the effect of family ownership on a firm’s performance based on
accounting or financial measures. Both studies, however, used a cut-off shareholding level of
at least 25 percent for Thai listed enterprises, since shareholders must have at least 75 percent
of their voting rights to obtain the absolute power over the public limited firm due to the
Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 of Thailand (Section 31). Hence, this study adopts
a cut-off shareholder level of at least 25 percent in classifying different types of firm
ownership.
A number of empirical studies have also investigated the effect of export participation
on a firm’s technical efficiency (the learning-by-exporting hypothesis). Kim (2003) used the
ratio of exports to total revenues as a proxy for export intensity, and found that exports
positively affect technical efficiency for the food and paper industries, but such a finding is
not found in the textile, chemical, and fabrication industries for Korean manufacturing
industries. Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003) used a dummy variable for exports, but found no
effect of exports on firm technical efficiency for 2,370 Danish firms. Granér and Isaksson
(2007) used a dummy variable as a proxy for export participation, and found that exports
significantly increased the technical efficiency of Kenyan manufacturing firms. Many
empirical studies have also investigated the effect of firm size on a firm’s performance based
on a firm’s technical efficiency. Their results are quite varied being based on different
countries and sectors. Empirical studies have also used different proxies for firm size, which
can be represented as either (i) total assets (see Kim (2003), Sheu and Yang (2005), Liao et al
(2010)), (ii) the number of employees (see Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004)), and (iii)
intermediate inputs Lundvall and Battese (2000), Hossain and Karunaratne (2004),
Oczkowski and Sharma (2005). Moreover, a number of empirical studies also investigated
the effect of firm age on a firm’s technical efficiency (see Lundvall and Battese, 2000). Their
findings are also quite mixed depending upon respective countries and sectors. The effect of
government assistance on

firm performance is also examined by a number of studies

(Tzelepis and Skuras, 2004, Girma et al., 2007). Their findings are still ambiguous depending
on the countries and industrial sectors studied.
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III. Data Sources and Data Classification
Data Sources
The raw data used in this study was obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand,
which consists of (i) the list of board of directors and major shareholders, (ii) financial
reports, (iii) annual reports of the Thai listed companies (the Form 56-1). Financial reports
consist of five major components: (i) an auditor’s report, (ii) statements of income, (iii)
balance sheet statements, (iv) statements of cash flows, and (v) notes to financial statements.
In addition, there are two types of financial reports: (i) an unconsolidated financial report and
(ii) a consolidated financial report. In this study, annually consolidated financial reports are
used, since all business activities of listed firms including their subsidiary companies are
recorded in annually consolidated financial reports. Form 56-1 is an annual company report
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), where all Thai listed firms are
obligated to disclose their annual business performance for shareholders and investors. Form
56-1 consists of three main parts: (i) executive summary, (ii) company issuing securities, and
(iii) confirmation of accuracy. Part (ii) is used for this study, which consists of the listed
company’s information, such as (a) risk factors and risk management, (b) nature of business
operation, (c) business operations of the company, (d) research and development, (e) business
assets, (f) future plans, (g) legal disputes, (h) capital structure, and (i) management, (j)
internal control, (k) related transactions, (l) financial position and operation performance, and
(m) reference information.
Data Classification
This study classifies manufacturing listed firms from among listed firms into eight
industrial sectors. The SET’s eight industrial sectors consist of (1) Agro and Food Industry
which can be sub grouped into (i) Agribusiness and (ii) Food and Beverage; (2) Consumer
Products which can be sub grouped into (i) Fashion, (ii) Home and Office Products, and (iii)
Personal Products and Pharmaceuticals; (3) Financials which can be divided into (i) Banking,
(ii) Finance and Securities, and (iii) Insurance; (4) Industrials which can be classified into (i)
Automotive, (ii) Industrial Materials and Machinery, (iii) Paper and Printing Materials, (iv)
Petrochemicals and Chemicals, and (v) Packaging; (5) Property and Construction which can
be divided into (i) Construction Materials, (ii) Property Development, and (iii) Property fund;
(6) Resources (energy & utilities); (7) Services which can be divided into (i) commerce, (ii)
6

Health Care Services, (iii) Media & Publishing, and (iv) Professional Services (Tourism &
Leisure and Transportation & Logistics); (8) Technology which can be divided into (i)
Electronic Components and (ii) Information and Communication technology. Besides eight
industrial sectors there are also 22 listed firms under rehabilitation (NPG) in 2008. The
securities of these listed firms have been suspended until they can meet the SET’s rules and
regulations in order to resume their trading again. With regard to International Standard
Industrial Classification of all economic activities (ISIC), it is necessary to remove some
listed firms that are not classified as manufacturing firms. In addition, this study also includes
listed manufacturing firms that had been delisted from the SET during 2000 to 2008. As a
result, 178 listed manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008 will be used to conduct
the empirical analysis of this study, which can be summarized in Table 1 as follows:
Table 1: Classification of Listed Manufacturing Firms in the SET during 2000 to 2008
No of sectors
1

2

3

4
5
6

Manufacturing Sectors

No of firms

No of firms

Agro & Food Industry
1.1 Agribusiness
1.2 Food & Beverage
Total
Consumer Products
2.1 Fashion
2.2 Home & Office Products
2.3 Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals
Total
Industrials
3.1 Automotive
3.2 Industrial Materials & Machinery
3.3 Packaging
3.4 Paper & Printing Materials
3.5 Petrochemicals & Chemicals
Total
Publishing
Construction Materials
Technology (Computer components)
Total listed manufacturing firms

20
20
40
18
11
4
33
12
19
13
2
13
59
7
27
12
178

Source: Authors

IV. Empirical Models
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the two-stage Data Envelopment
Analysis approaches are used to conduct the empirical analysis. The differences between the
SFA and the DEA approaches are that the SFA requires functional forms on the production
frontier, and assumes that firms may deviate from the production frontier not only due to
7

technical inefficiency but also from measurement errors, statistical noise or other nonsystematic influences (Admassie and Matambalya, 2002). In addition, the SFA requires
strong distribution assumptions of both statistical random errors (i.e., normal distribution) and
non-negative technical inefficiency random variables (i.e., half-normal distribution for timeinvariant inefficiency model (see Pitt and Lee (1981)), and truncated normal distribution for
both the time-invariant inefficiency model (see Battese and Coelli (1988)) and the timevariant inefficiency model (see Battese and Coelli (1992,1995)). The DEA approach,
)

however, does not impose functional forms, and uses linear programming to construct a
frontier that envelops the observations of all firms. Hence, all firms are compared relative to
the “best” performing firms. It also overcomes restrictions on the production and distribution
of various residuals.
The Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model
The basic stochastic production function frontier was independently proposed by
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) within a cross-sectional
context. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) applied the method of maximum likelihood
under the assumptions of a half-normal model, assuming the inefficiency components
(

are independently and identically distributed half-normal random variables with

variance

~

0,

and the statistical components (

are independently and

identically distributed normal random variables with zero means and variances
~

0,

. In addition, Schmidt and Sickles (1984, p. 367) noted that stochastic
)

frontier models that use cross-sectional data suffer from three serious difficulties. First, the
technical efficiency of a firm can be estimated but its estimates may not be consistent, since
the variance of the distribution of technical efficiency, conditional on the whole error term,
for each individual producer does not vanish (becomes zero) as the size of the cross section
(sample size) increases. Second, maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic production
frontier model and the separation of technical inefficiency from statistical noise, both require
strong distributional assumptions of (i) technical inefficiency (e.g., half-normal distribution)
and (ii) statistical noise (e.g., normal distribution). Third, maximum likelihood estimation
requires an assumption that the non-negative technical inefficiency error components are not
related to the independent variables in the model but, in fact, if firms perceive the level of
their technical inefficiency they tend to adjust their input choices relative to the level of their
technical inefficiency. In other words, the firms’ technical inefficiency might be correlated
8

with their input choices. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) also suggested that having access to
panel data can avoid the disadvantages mentioned by Schmidt and Sickles (1984). First, panel
data (repeated observations on a sample of firms) can relax the independent and strong
distributional assumptions. Second, adding more observations for each firm can provide more
information compared with cross sectional data, and the firm’s technical efficiency can be
estimated consistently since the number of observations of the firm begins to increase.
According to Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Kumbhakar and Lovel (2000), the
preferred model is the stochastic frontier production function model based on the time-variant
efficiency model of Battese and Coelli (1995). The model of Battese and Coelli (1995) allows
the technical efficiency levels to change over time, since firms expect to learn from their
learning-by-doing experience. As the panel becomes larger the technical efficiency effects
would change. The model consists of two main components. The first component is to
estimate the time-varying stochastic frontier production function which contains two random
errors: (i) random errors (

) and non-negative random variables (

). The first random

errors, which are assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal random
variables with zero means and variances,

~

0,

, can be observed, for

example, when the problems of omitted variables and model misspecification arise. The
second non-negative random variables which are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed normal random variables as truncations at zero with Zit
variances

~

0,

means and

are known as the technical inefficiency effects. In addition,

these two random variables are assumed to be independently distributed for all time periods
(t=1,2,…..,T) and all firms (i=1,2,….,N).
The second component links firm-specific variables (i.e., types of firm ownership,
firm age, and firm size) with the inefficiency effects or the non-negative random variables. In
other words, this part aims to examine what firm-specific variables significantly affect the
firm’s inefficiency. The stochastic frontier production function and the inefficiency effects
will be simultaneously estimated by the method of maximum likelihood (ML) which has
desirable large sample (or asymptotic) properties. More specifically, the ML estimator is
consistent and asymptotically efficient (Coelli, 2005, p. 218). FRONTIER Version 4.1 is used
to conduct a single - step process in which the stochastic frontier production and the model of
technical inefficiency effects are estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum
likelihood estimation (Quasi-Newton methods) (see Coelli (1996)). This software utilizes the
9

parameterisation from Battese and Corra (1977) by replacing
/

and

. The technical inefficiency for the

(1995) model is given by TE

and

with

firm in the Battese and Coelli

= exp (- U ,) = exp (-Z δ - W ). Applying the model of

Battese and Coelli (1995), the stochastic frontier production functions in the Cobb-Douglas
and translog functional forms are tested for adequate functional form. The Cobb-Douglas
functional form can be written as:
ln

ln

ln

(1.1)

The translog functional form can be written as:
ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln

ln
ln

ln

–

(1.2)

Where:
= Sales revenue deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI)
of firm i at time t
= Employee expenses deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI)
of firm i at time t
= Net productive fixed assets deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of
capital goods of firm i at time t
= Intermediate inputs deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of
intermediate inputs of firm i at time t
=

Random error (

~

0,

))

= Non-negative random variable (or technical inefficiency) (

~

Zit ,

))

The Inefficiency Effects Model can be written as follows:

5
&

+

+
+

(1.3)
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Where:
= Leverage of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of total debt to
total assets (the D/A Ratio)
= Liquidity of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities (the Current Ratio)
= Dummy for internal financing;
= 1 if firm i at time t borrows from related parties.
= 0, otherwise
= External financing, represented by total interest expenses deflated by
the general Producer Price Index (PPI)
= Executive Remuneration of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio
of top executive and board member remunerations to total employee expenses
5 = Controlling ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the
percentage of equity owned by the five largest shareholders
= Managerial ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the percentage of equity
owned by top executives and board members
= Exports of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of export revenue
to total sales revenue
&
= Dummy for Research and Development:
= 1 if firm i at time t has R&D.
&
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for a family-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a family-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for a foreign-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a foreign-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for a domestic-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a domestically-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for a hybrid-owned firm:
= 1 if firm i at time t is a hybrid-owned firm.
= 0, otherwise
= Size of firm i at time t, represented by the logarithm form of total assets
= Age of firm i at time t, represented by the number of operating years
= Dummy for Government support
= 1 if firm i at time t receives Board of Investment (BOI)’s support.
= 0, otherwise
= Dummy for foreign cooperation
= 1 if firm i at time t engages in foreign cooperation
11

= 0, otherwise
= Random error (( ~ 0,

))

Basic descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned above are provided in the
Appendix.
Two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can also be used to predict
technical efficiency, which involves the use of a linear programming method to construct a
non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data (Coelli et al., 2005, p.162). The
term “Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)” was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (1978) (or the CCR model). The CCR model proposed an efficiency measurement
obtained by maximizing the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs, subject to the given
constraints that all efficiency measures cannot be greater than 1. In addition, this model does
not require a priori specification of weights or explicit functional forms in examining the
relationship between inputs and outputs (Banker et al., 1984). Unlike the CCR model,
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) (or the BCC model) considered variable returns to scale
(by assuming the convexity assumption: I1

1 , which allows separation between

technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The BCC model, therefore, can determine whether a
firm is operating under increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale for multiple
outputs and inputs. This study applies the variable returns to scale (VRS) linear programming
problem to predict the technical efficiency for the first-stage of the two-stage DEA approach
(see F re, Grosskopf, Logan (1983) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984)). The VRS
assumes that firms are not operating at an optimal scale due to imperfect competition,
government intervention, and financial constraints (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition, the output
orientated model is used, assuming fixed input amounts and maximized output production.
The VRS linear programming program under the output orientated model can be written as
follows:
,

,
0, i=1,2,….,n,

st

0,
I1

1,
0,

(1.4)
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Where:

0, and

is a scalar. 1

which can be obtained for the
efficiency score for the
for the

firm.

firm.

is the proportional increase in outputs ( )

firm, while holding input amounts ( ) constant.
is an output vector for the

is a vector of constants.

firm.

is the

is an input vector

defines non-increasing returns to scale

(NIRS).
The DEA problem under equation (1.4), for example, takes the firm i, and radially
expands the output vector of the firm i ( ) as much as possible, while still remaining within
the feasible output set. The inner-boundary of this output set is a piece-wise linear production
possibility curve which is determined by all the firms in the sample (see Figure 1). The DEA
model in linear programming (1.4) also replaces the convexity constraint which is imposed
for the VRS: I1

1 for I1

1. The modified I1

be non-increasing. In other words, the constraint: I1

1 indicates that the VRS can only
1 is set to ensure that the

firm is

compared with firms that are smaller than it (see Coelli et al. (2005, p.174)). The linear
)

programming problem (1.4) can also be illustrated in Figure 1 as follows:
Figure 1: Efficiency measurement under the output-orientated DEA model
Output (Y)
CRS Frontier
NIRS Frontier

G

VRS Frontier

P

0

A

Input (X)

Source: Authors
Note: Figure 1 is modified from Figures 3.7 and 6.3 of Coelli et al. (2005, p. 55, 171). The original Figures
described Input- and Output- Orientated Technical Efficiency Measures and Returns to Scale (Figure 3.7), and
the scale efficiency measurement under the input-orientated DEA model (Figure 6.3).
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Figure 1 only explains the case of one output and one input as an example. The VRS
technical inefficiency is expressed, for example, by the distance between P to
technical inefficiency is expressed by the distance between P to

. The CRS

. The difference between

the CRS and VRS technical inefficiencies, which is given by the distance between
to

, indicates scale inefficiency. In addition, the VRS technical efficiency can be

expressed by the distance ratio A
expressed by the ratio A

to AP, while the CRS technical efficiency can be

to AP. The scale efficiency is simply the ratio of the CRS technical

efficiency to the VRS technical efficiency (AP / AP ). However, the disadvantage of this
measure of scale efficiency is that it does not indicate whether a firm is operating under
increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale. The term, non-increasing returns to scale
(I1

1 technical efficiency is imposed in conducting further analysis for increasing,

constant, and increasing returns to scale. If the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS)
technical efficiency score is equal to the VRS technical efficiency score, for example, as is
the case for point G, then decreasing returns to scale exist. If the NIRS technical efficiency
score and the VRS technical efficiency score are not equal (as is the case for point P), then
increasing returns to scale apply (see F re et al. (1983)). If the CRS technical efficiency is
equal to VRS technical efficiency, constant returns to scale apply.
One problem of the piece-wise linear frontier in DEA is that firms operating parallel
to the axes causes the problem of “slacks”. For instance, a firm operating on the production
frontier (or on the efficient point), but the amount of inputs can be reduced without changing
the output, is called an “input slack” (or input excess) problem for the input-orientated model.
For the output-orientated model this problem is also known as “output slack” (or output
excess), since a firm’s production can be increased without using any more inputs. There are
a number of ways in which to treat the problem of slack (e.g., one-stage DEA, two-stage
DEA, and multi-stage DEA). One-stage DEA solves the problem through linear
programming, for example the output-oriented model (1.4), where slacks are calculated
residually. Two-stage DEA maximizes the sum of slacks required to move from the firststage projected point (as for point

in Figure 1) to an efficient point (as for point

in Figure 1 . However, two-stage DEA is applicable when there is only one efficient point
to select from the vertical facet, but it is not applicable when there are two or more
dimensions of slacks. As a result, multiple-stage DEA can be useful, since it is invariant to
units of measurement and its efficient projected points have input and output mixes that are
similar to those of the inefficient points. These slack treatments can be applied by the Data
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Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Program (DEAP) version 2.1. For the DEAP software
there are three choices with respect to the treatment of slacks, these are (i) one-stage DEA,
(ii) two-stage DEA, and (iii) multi-stage DEA. Coelli et al. (2005, p.198) recommended
multi-stage DEA. Hence, multi-stage DEA will be selected in this study to predict the VRS
technical efficiency as well as the CRS technical efficiency for the first-stage of the two-stage
DEA model.The second stage of the two-stage DEA model is conducted by regressing
environmental variables on the firm’s VRS technical inefficiency scores which are predicted
from the first step of the two-stage DEA model. The firm’s technical inefficiency scores are
used as the dependent variable, which is obtained by subtracting the efficiency scores
estimated from the DEA model from “one”. The set of environmental variables are used as
independent variables for the two-stage DEA model. The estimated inefficiency scores are
normally bounded between zero and one. Applying the method of Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) with such a dependent variable that its values are bounded between zero and one will
lead to biased and inconsistent estimators, since the OLS method is likely to predict
inefficiency scores which are greater than one (Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, the Maximum
Likelihood estimation for a Tobit model is adopted, which is given as follows:
∑

(1-

+

(1.5)

Where:
1-

= Inefficiency scores of firm i and time t.
= Unknown parameter to be estimated for each environmental variable j at time t
= Random error ((

~

0,

))

V. Hypothesis Tests
There are a number of null hypotheses for the SFA approach that will be tested such
as (i) the validation of the Cobb-Douglas production function, (ii) the absence of technical
progress, (iii) the absence of neutral technical progress (iv) the absence of inefficiency
effects, (v) the absence of stochastic inefficiency effects, (vi) the insignificance of joint
inefficiency variables (see Table 2). A likelihood-ratio test (LR test) is used to test these
hypotheses, which can be conducted as follows:
2 log

log

(1.6)
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Where, log

and log

are obtained from the maximized values of the log-

likelihood function under the null hypothesis (

) and the alternative hypothesis (

),

respectively. The LR test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with parameters
equal to the number of restricted parameters imposed under the null hypothesis (

), except

hypotheses (iii) and (iv) which have a “mixed” chi-square distribution (see Kodde and Palm
(1986)). Hypotheses (iii) and (iv) involve the restriction that

is equal to zero, which

defines a point on the boundary of the parameter space (Coelli, 1996, p. 6). From Table 2 the
null hypothesis (i) is to test whether the Cobb-Douglas production function is adequate for
Thai listed manufacturing firms. Following equations (1.1) and (1.2) the null hypothesis
0

is

strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sectors.
Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production function is not an adequate specification for the case
of the SET’s manufacturing sector, compared with the specification of the Translog
production function model. This also indicates that input and substitution elasticities are not
constant among firms (see Lundvall and Battese, 2000).
The null hypothesis (ii) that there is no technical progress
0

is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s

manufacturing sector, indicating that technical progress exists. Under the translog
specification technology for (1.2), the percentage change in output in each period due to
=

technological change (t) is given by

+2

t (see Coelli et al., 2005). From Table 3

technological change affects the percentage change to output by 0.091+2* (-0.05)* t. The
slope of

in the translog production function (1.2) is negative, which is given by -0.05, also

indicating that technological progress tends to decrease over time. The null hypothesis (iii)
that technical progress is neutral

0

0 is also rejected at the 5 percent

level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector. This indicates that technical change
not only merely affects average output, but also changes marginal rates of technical
substitution. In other words the marginal rate of substitution is not dependent on time,
indicating that Hicks neutral technology does not exist for the SET’s manufacturing sector.
From Table 3 the estimates of

and

are also significantly negative and positive,

respectively, for the SET’s manufacturing sector. This evidence implies that there is the
existence of labour-using and capital-saving technical progress for the SET’s manufacturing
sector over the period 2000 to 2008. The null hypothesis (iv) which specifies that the
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inefficiency effects are absent from the model

0 is strongly rejected

…

at the 5 percent level of significance, which implies that the model of inefficiency effects
exists for the case of the SET’s manufacturing sector.
The null hypothesis (v) that the inefficiency effects are not “stochastic” (

0 is

strongly rejected, implying that the model of inefficiency effects is not reduced to a
traditional mean response function. In other words, all the explanatory variables in the
inefficiency effects model are not included in the production function, implying that the
inefficiency effects model exists and therefore the estimated parameters can be identified in
the model of inefficiency effects. As a result the average response function in which all listed
manufacturing firms are assumed to be fully technically efficient is not found for the case of
the SET’s manufacturing sector, given the assumptions of the translog stochastic frontier and
the inefficiency effects model. In addition, if the estimate of the variance parameter ( ) is
close to one, it indicates that overall residual variation (

and

inefficiency components (

(0.872) is high for the SET’s

. From Table 3 the estimated

) highly results from

manufacturing sector, indicating that much of the variation in the composite error term is due
to inefficiency effects (

.

The last null hypothesis specifies that inefficiency effects are not a linear function of
0 . In other words the null

all explanatory variables

hypothesis specifies that all parameters of the explanatory variables are equal to zero. All LR
test statistics are greater than the critical value of an approximately chi-square distribution
(see Table 2) at the 5 percent level of significance, implying that the null hypothesis that all
coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal to zero is strongly rejected at the 5 percent
level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector, given the specification of the
Translog stochastic frontier and the model of inefficiency effects. According to the rejection
of the last null hypothesis test, the model of inefficiency effects of the SET’s manufacturing
sector can be assumed to be independently and identically distributed as truncations at zero of
the normal distribution with mean,

and variance,

(see Battese and Coelli (1995)).

For the two-stage DEA model the null hypothesis that all parameters of the explanatory
variables are equal to zero is also rejected at the 5 level of significance (see Table 4). In
addition, the majority of the estimates of the Translog production frontier parameters are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing
sector (see Table 3). It is also common to observe that some of the individual coefficients of
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the Translog stochastic frontier are not statistically insignificant due to high multicollinearity
among the inputs (see Lundvall and Battese (2000), Oczkowski and Sharma (2005)).
Table 2: Statistics for the Hypotheses Tests of the Stochastic Frontier and Inefficiency
Effects Models

Manufacturing Sector
Null Hypothesis

LR

Critical

Decision

Statistics

Value

211.94

18.31

Reject

25.93

11.07

Reject

33.92

7.81

Reject

628.05

29.55*

Reject

1207.1

2.71*

Reject

292.66

27.59

Reject

(i) Cobb-Douglas
:
0
(ii) No technical progress
:
0
(iii) Neutral technical change
:

0

(iv) No inefficiency effects
:

0

(v) Non stochastic inefficiency
(

:

0

(vi) No joint inefficiency
:

0

Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: All critical values of the test statistics are subject to the 5% level of significance; * indicates a mixture of
the
distribution (see Kodde and Palm, 1986).

VI. Consistency of the Results from Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier
Analysis
Average technical efficiency scores for the SET’s manufacturing sector predicted by
the SFA and the DEA are quite close, given by 0.812 and 0.887 respectively (see Table 6).
Average technical efficiency scores obtained from the SFA normally should be lower than
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those scores obtained from the DEA, since technical efficiency scores predicted by the DEA
cannot be separated from the non-negative technical inefficiency components (
random error terms (

s). However, if the estimated

is close to 1 this implies that the error

variation is mainly due to inefficiency effects. For this study
indicates that overall error variation (
(

and

) from

is given by 0.872 which

) is mostly due to inefficiency components

, and insignificantly caused by random error terms (

. Undoubtedly, technical

efficiency scores can also be smaller than those scores obtained from DEA (see Sirasoontorn
(2004)).
As discussed in Figure 1 the advantage of the DEA approach is that it can examine
whether each of the listed manufacturing firms are operating under increasing returns to scale
(IRS), decreasing returns to scale (DRS), or constant returns to scale (CRS). From Table 6
there is strong evidence that approximately 86 percent of the listed manufacturing firms were
operating under decreasing returns to scale (DRS) on average over the period 2000 to 2008,
given the specification of the output-orientated model. For a comparison analysis between the
SFA and two-stage DEA approaches only the empirical results of the two-stage DEA
approach under the variable returns to scale (VRS) are used to compare with the empirical
results obtained from the SFA, since the VRS technical inefficiency scores obtained from the
two-stage DEA are basically equivalent to “pure” technical inefficiency scores obtained from
SFA. Moreover, the CRS technical inefficiency scores obtained from DEA can be
decomposed into (i) pure technical inefficiency (or CRS technical inefficiency) and (ii) scale
inefficiency (see Coelli et al., 2005, p. 172). The empirical results of both the SFA and the
two-stage DEA are found to produce quite consistent results, which are summarized in Table
5. Both approaches confirm that leverage (financial constraints) has a significantly positive
effect on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector, implying that
financially constrained firms tend to utilize their financial resources and control input costs
effectively, leading to an enhancement in their technical efficiency. To confirm this
conclusion, both estimation approaches also confirm that a firm’s leverage is found to be
statistically significantly negatively related with its technical efficiency for the SET’s
manufacturing sector. Both approaches also confirm that external financing has a statistically
negative association with a firm’s technical efficiency, but the relationship is very weak since
the size of the “external financing” coefficient is very small. In addition, “internal financing”
is also found to have a negative effect on a firm’s technical efficiency, but the results from
both approaches are statistically inconclusive. This implies that the agency problem exists for
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the use of internal funds, since managers do not appear to maximize shareholders’ interests or
have strong incentives to abuse internal funds. This is especially the case in underdeveloped
countries where firms’ managerial rights are not fully developed and their information is not
fully publicized, and therefore managers attempt to maximize their benefits rather than the
firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p.134).
The coefficient for “executive remuneration” is also found to be statistically
significant for both approaches, indicating that listed manufacturing firms with higher levels
of executive remuneration tend to have more technical efficiency. According to the finance
literature regarding ownership structure, the empirical results from both approaches confirm
that managerial ownership has a significantly positive relationship with the firm’s technical
efficiency. This indicates that the agency problem is reduced, since managerial ownership can
help align the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. Controlling ownership
is found to have a positive association with the firm’s technical efficiency, but the
significance results from both approaches are statistically different. This result supports the
agency theory that controlling shareholders are likely to perform better than dispersed
shareholders, since a high level of ownership concentration can reduce agency costs.
Learning-by-exporting evidence is also found for Thai listed manufacturing
enterprises, since the empirical evidence from the two approaches confirm that the coefficient
for “exports” has a significant and positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency. This
result implies that export market experience (i.e., new product designs and production
methods), which is gained from communication between foreign partners and exporting
firms, tends to improve the technical efficiency of exporting firms. However, research &
development (R&D) is found to be statistically negative with the firm‘s technical efficiency
among Thai listed manufacturing firms. This result is different from many empirical results
that R&D has a positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency (see Part II). Such a negative
finding also implies that most listed manufacturing firms doubtfully reported their R&D
activities in their annual report, and in fact did not intend to implement them seriously.
Focusing on the classification of different ownership types among listed
manufacturing firms the results from both approaches indicate that family-owned firms,
foreign-owned firms, and hybrid-owned firms have a statistically positive relationship with
firm technical efficiency. For domestic owned-firms the significance results from both
approaches are statistically different. Joint-owned firms have a statistically negative
relationship with a firm’s technical efficiency, as indicated by a positive constant coefficient
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(the base firm). Foreign-owned firms perform the best among other types of owned firms,
followed by family-owned firms, hybrid-owned firms, and domestic-owned firms, given
joint-owned firms as the base firm. Moreover, there is strong evidence that a firm’s size tends
to have a statistically positive effect on its technical efficiency. The effect of a firm’s age on
its technical efficiency is found to be ambiguous due to the difference in both coefficient
signs and significance results. Similarly, the relationship between government assistance and
a firm’s technical efficiency is found to be inconclusive due to the same significance results
but differences in the coefficient signs. Lastly, foreign cooperation has a negative impact on a
firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector, but such a finding is
statistically weak due to the difference in the significance results between these two
approaches.
VII. Implications from the Results
Dealing with unbalanced panel data Frontier Version 4.1 can be used to analyse the
time-variant efficiency model of Battese and Coelli (1995). The advantage of the stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) approach under the specification of Battese and Coelli (1995) is that it
allows investigation of technical progress through an estimated production function. For the
DEA approach the investigation for technological progress can be referred, for example, to
the use of Malmquist TFP index which can be decomposed into “technical efficiency change”
and “technological change”. A Malmquist TFP index analysed by the DEA, however, can
only be applied for the case of balanced panel data. The DEA approach can examine types of
returns to scale for the firm’s production in both the firm-level and industry-level context, but
the SFA approach can investigate types of returns to scale only for the industry-level context
through an aggregate of estimated input elasticities (See Coelli et al., 2005, p. 304).
This can be calculated by the sum of estimated input coefficients obtained from an
estimated production function, given the specification of a Translog frontier production
function (see Table 3). The result, given by 0.545 ( +

) 3 , indicates the existence of

moderate decreasing returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. Similarly, the
DEA approach also highlights that approximately 86% of listed manufacturing enterprises, on
average, operated under decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Table
6). The significance coefficients of time interacted with capital (

and labour

) are

negative and positive, respectively, indicating that technical change has been labour-using but
3

The coefficients and are statistically significant at the 5 % level of significance, but
significant at the 5 % level of significance (see Table 3).

is not statistically
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capital-saving (see Table 3). This result implies that technological progress for Thai listed
manufacturing firms still relies on basic production resources, such as the labour input.
Similarly, the negative coefficient of time squared (

also confirms that technological

change has been decreasing over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Table 3). According to the
empirical evidence from these two approaches, industry-specific policy guidelines are also
recommended to promote technical efficiency. Policy guidelines can be implemented as
follows: (i) promote more firm ownership participation for a group of people (i.e., workers,
administrative staff, managers, and owners) who control or participate in listed
manufacturing firms, and encourage listed manufacturing firms to set up attractive rewards
for top management and board of directors when firms achieve a certain level of profits as
planned; (ii) encourage more foreign participation in listed manufacturing firms; (iii)
encourage listed manufacturing firms to engage in more export participation; (iv) promote an
increase in firm size. Further study can also focus on the following research issues, such as (i)
investigate the SET’s sub-manufacturing sectors, (ii) study non-linear effects of firm-specific
variables (i.e., firm size, firm age, controlling ownership, and managerial ownership) on a
firm’s technical efficiency, and (iii) investigate the effect of a firm’s technical efficiency on
its export performance (the self-selection exporting hypothesis). In addition, there might be
other inefficiency variables or other proxy variables (i.e., R&D expenditures) which can
affect technical efficiency, but they are beyond the scope of this study due to data
unavailability.
VIII. Conclusions
This study has applied the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the two-stage Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. Dealing with unbalanced panel data, the SFA
approach seems to be more favourable than the DEA approach in analysing firm technical
efficiency and the model of inefficiency effects, since the analysis for technical progress
conducted by the DEA approach is not applicable for unbalanced panel data. The DEA
approach, however, can analyse types of returns to scale (i.e., decreasing returns to scale
(DRS), increasing returns to scale (IRS), and constant returns to scale (CRS)) for both the
firm-level and industry-level contexts, but the SFA approach only analyses returns to scale
for the industry-level context. Both estimation approaches can be applied for robustness. The
empirical evidence from both approaches highlighted that Thai listed manufacturing firms
had been operating under decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 2008.
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Table 3: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of the Stochastic Frontier
Production Function and the Inefficiency Effects Model
Stochastic
Variables
Constant
log(L)**
log(K)**
log(M)**
t
½ (log(L)2)
½ (log(K)2)
½ (log(M)2)
½ (t2)
log(L)*log(K)
log(L)*log(M)
log(L)* t
log(K)*log(M)
log(K)*t
log(M)*t

Parameters

Stochastic
Frontier
3.871*
(0.512)
1.002*
(0.132)
‐0.700*
(0.109)
0.243
(0.152)
0.091*
(0.043)
0.079*
(0.022)
‐0.101*
(0.026)
0.129*
(0.028)
‐0.005
(0.005)
0.088*
(0.023)
‐0.211*
(0.026)
‐0.020*
(0.008)
0.089*
(0.019)
0.016*
(0.006)
‐0.004
(0.007)

Inefficiency
Variables
Constant
Leverage
Liquidity
Internal financing
External financing
Executive remuneration
Controlling ownership
Managerial ownership
Exports
R&D
Family ‐owned firm
Foreign ‐owned firm
Domestic‐ owned firm
Hybrid ‐owned firm
Firm size
Firm age
Government assistance
Foreign cooperation
Variance parameters
sigma‐square
gamma
Log‐likelihood function

Parameters

Inefficiency
Effects
13.257*
(1.850)
‐0.038*
(0.019)
0.219*
(0.016)
0.635*
(0.139)
0.0007*
(0.00006)
‐0.433*
(0.212)
‐0.035*
(0.003)
‐0.023*
(0.004)
‐0.012*
(0.002)
0.746*
(0.150)
‐3.681*
(0.281)
‐3.910*
(0.504)
‐1.420*
(0.206)
‐2.726*
(0.192)
‐0.777*
(0.125)
‐0.040*
(0.005)
‐0.716*
(0.171)
0.191*
(0.097)
1.080*
(0.067)
0.872*
(0.012)
‐745.05

Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at
the 5% level; ** L is the labour input, K is the capital input, and M is the intermediate input (see equation
(1.2)).
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Table 4: Maximum-Likelihood Tobit Estimates for Parameters of the Two-Stage DEA
approach
VARIABLES

PARAMETERS

DEA
(VRS)
Left censoring (value) at zero
93
Uncensored observations
1214
Total observations
1307
Dependent variable: Technical inefficiency (VRS) and Technical inefficiency (CRS)
Constant
0.5838*
(0.0294)
Leverage
‐0.0048*
(0.0012)
Liquidity
0.0023*
(0.0006)
Internal financing
0.0052
(0.0037)
External financing
0.0000*
(0.0000)
Executive remuneration
‐0.1018*
(0.0186)
Controlling ownership
‐0.0002
(0.0001)
Managerial ownership
‐0.0004*
(0.0001)
Exports
‐0.0001**
(0.0001)
R&D
0.0145*
(0.0044)
Family‐ owned firms
‐0.0272*
(0.0067)
Foreign‐ owned firms
‐0.0428*
(0.0076)
Domestic‐ owned firms
‐0.0067
(0.0083)
Hybrid ‐owned firms
‐0.0224*
(0.0084)
Firm size
‐0.0295*
(0.0017)
Firm age
0.0000
(0.0002)
Government assistance
0.0076**
(0.0040)
Foreign cooperation
0.0030
(0.0033)
Error Distribution
0.059*
(0.001)
Log likelihood (unrestricted)
1594
1405
Log likelihood
LR test
377*
Critical value
27.59

DEA
(CRS)
19
1288
1307
0.2297*
(0.0301)
0.0015
(0.0012)
0.0030*
(0.0006)
0.0090*
(0.0038)
0.0000
(0.0000)
‐0.1850*
(0.0185)
‐0.0003*
(0.0001)
‐0.0004*
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0134*
(0.0045)
‐0.0226*
(0.0070)
‐0.0342*
(0.0078)
‐0.0244*
(0.0086)
‐0.0232*
(0.0087)
‐0.0019
(0.0018)
0.0009*
(0.0002)
0.0123*
(0.0042)
0.0032
(0.0034)
0.062*
(0.001)
1740
1596
288*
27.59

Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at
the 5% level;**indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level; *** Inefficiency
scores are regressed by a constant.
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Table 5: Comparison of the Results of Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters
between the SFA and the Two-Stage DEA approaches
Dependent variable:
Technical inefficiency
Independent variables :
Constant
Leverage
Liquidity
Internal financing
External financing
Executive remuneration
Controlling ownership
Managerial ownership
Exports
R&D
Family owned firm
Foreign owned firm
Domestic owned firm
Hybrid owned firm
Firm size
Firm age
Government assistance
Foreign cooperation

Manufacturing Sector
SFA (pure)

DEA(VRS)

+*
‐*
+*
+*
+*
‐*
‐*
‐*
‐*
+*
‐*
‐*
‐*
‐*
‐*
‐*
‐*
+*

+*
‐*
+*
+
+*
‐*
‐
‐*
‐**
+*
‐*
‐*
‐
‐*
‐*
+
+**
+

Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level;**indicates that the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level.

The SFA approach also found that technical progress had been decreasing over the
period 2000 to 2008, and had relied on basic production resources such as labour input.
Focusing on what factors significantly influence a firm’s technical inefficiency both
parametric and non-parametric approaches are found to produce empirically consistent results
(see Table 5). The empirical results reveal that financially constrained firms tend to improve
their technical efficiency through the effective control of input costs and financial resources.
On the contrary, financially healthy firms are likely to neglect increasing their technical
efficiency due to financial liquidity. External financing tends to decrease the firm’s technical
efficiency, but its importance is very weak due to a very small estimated coefficient.
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Table 6: Average Efficiency Scores and Types of Returns to Scale (by the Number of
Listed Manufacturing Firms)

Year
2000
SFA
DEA
2001
SFA
DEA
2002
SFA
DEA
2003
SFA
DEA
2004
SFA
DEA
2005
SFA
DEA
2006
SFA
DEA
2007
SFA
DEA
2008
SFA
DEA
2000 ‐ 2008
SFA
DEA

Efficiency Scores
CRSTE VRSTE
SCALE

Returns to Scale (by number of firms)
DRS
%
IRS
%
CRS
%

‐
0.814

0.807
0.871

‐
0.936

‐
100

‐
73%

‐
33

‐
24%

‐
4

‐
3%

‐
0.838

0.803
0.895

‐
0.938

‐
109

‐
81%

‐
23

‐
17%

‐
3

‐
2%

‐
0.832

0.803
0.896

‐
0.93

‐
115

‐
85%

‐
18

‐
13%

‐
3

‐
2%

‐
0.89

0.807
0.927

‐
0.96

‐
114

‐
83%

‐
18

‐
13%

‐
5

‐
4%

‐
0.826

0.821
0.901

‐
0.917

‐
139

‐
95%

‐
5

‐
3%

‐
2

‐
1%

‐
0.779

0.817
0.878

‐
0.889

‐
138

‐
91%

‐
12

‐
8%

‐
2

‐
1%

‐
0.789

0.82
0.878

‐
0.9

‐
140

‐
89%

‐
15

‐
10%

‐
2

‐
1%

‐
0.784

0.816
0.876

‐
0.897

‐
141

‐
91%

‐
12

‐
8%

‐
2

‐
1%

‐
0.787

0.812
0.87

‐
0.906

‐
135

‐
88%

‐
14

‐
9%

‐
5

‐
3%

‐
0.814

0.812
0.887

‐
0.918

‐
126

‐
86%

‐
17

‐
12%

‐
3

‐
2%

Source: Authors’ estimates
Note: From the left section CRSTE is the constant returns to scale technical efficiency; VRSTE is the variable
returns to scale technical efficiency; SCALE is the scale efficiency. From the right section DRS is the
decreasing returns to scale technical efficiency; IRS is increasing returns to scale technical efficiency; CRS is
constant returns to scale technical efficiency.
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There is evidence that internal financing has a negative relationship with a firm’s
technical efficiency, but the empirical results of both approaches are statistically different.
This result highlights that managers tend to utilize internal funds ineffectively due to lack of
external monitoring. Kim (2003, p.134) also emphasized that this normally exists in several
underdeveloped countries where firms’ managerial skills are not fully strengthened and their
information is not fully disclosed, and therefore there is an opportunity for managers to
maximize their benefits rather than the firm’s value. Controlling and managerial ownerships
have a significantly positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency. This result implies
that a group of people who receive direct benefits from the firm through dividends relative to
the level of their cash flow or voting rights tend to monitor the firm carefully and effectively.
On the contrary, dispersed shareholders or managers who do not hold any ownership over a
firm’s cash flow or voting stocks are likely to monitor the firm ineffectively, since they
perceive that they only receive less dividends or monthly salaries. Similarly, executive
remuneration is found to have a significantly positive effect on technical efficiency. In
practice, the amount of bonuses or increased salaries that executives (i.e., board of directors
and managers) will receive depends upon the firm’s annual net profits. In some listed firms,
the amount of executive remuneration (i.e., bonuses) that executives receive is based on the
percentage of the firm’s annual net profits. Hence, a firm that provides high executive
remuneration tends to achieve an increase in technical efficiency.
The empirical evidence for both estimation approaches also indicates that exporting
firms are also likely to improve their technical efficiency due to their learning-by-exporting
experience (i.e., new product designs and production methods). Focusing on the relationship
between types of firm ownership and technical efficiency it was found that foreign owned
firms perform the best, followed by family owned-firms, hybrid-owned firms, and domesticowned firms, given joint-owned firms as the base firm category. There is strong evidence
from both approaches that foreign-owned firms, family-owned firms, and hybrid-owned firms
have a significantly positive effect on technical efficiency, except domestic-owned firms
which produce a difference in the statistically significant results of both approaches, and
joint-owned firms which have a significant negative effect on technical efficiency. Firm size
is also one of the factors that positively affects the firm’s technical efficiency due to
economies of scale. However, the effects of firm age and government assistance on technical
efficiency are still inconclusive (see Table 5). Foreign cooperation is found to have a negative
effect on technical efficiency, but the results from both approaches are statistically different.
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Appendix: Data Summary
Variables

Output
Ln (Sales revenue)
Inputs:
Ln (Labour expenses)
Ln (Fixed productive)
Ln (Intermediate inputs)
Time trend
Finance:
Leverage
Liquidity
Internal financing
External financing
R&D
Ownership structure:
Controlling ownership
Managerial ownership
Types of owned firms:
Family‐owned firm
Foreign‐owned firm
Domestic owned firm
Joint owned firm
Hybrid owned firm
Executive remuneration
Exports
Other factors:
Ln (total assets)
Firm age
Government assistance
Foreign cooperation

Unit of Variables

Mean Median

Max

Min

Std. Dev. Observations

Natural Logarithm

9.95

9.88

14.56

5.49

1.36

1309

Natural Logarithm
Natural Logarithm
Natural Logarithm
No. of years

7.64
8.84
9.51
5

7.66
8.68
9.40
5

11.84
13.61
14.26
9

3.71
3.57
5.28
1

1.15
1.56
1.45
3

1309
1309
1309
1309

Ratio
Ratio
Dummy (ratio)
000 Baht
Dummy (ratio)

0.57
2.4
0.35
1747
0.8

0.43 29.13
1.57
46.2
0
1
203 140304
1
1

0.01
0
0
0
0

1.5
2.81
0.48
7721
0.4

1309
1309
1309
1309
1309

Ratio
Ratio

58.81
20.55

58.82
12.70

5.44
0

16.51
21.69

1309
1309

Dummy (ratio)
Dummy (ratio)
Dummy (ratio)
Dummy (ratio)
Dummy (ratio)
Ratio
%

0.53
0.19
0.12
0.07
0.09
0.14
32.68

1
0
0
0
0
0.09
19.32

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
7 0.0032
100
0

0.5
0.39
0.32
0.26
0.29
0.32
33.53

1309
1309
1309
1309
1309
1309
1309

Natural Logarithm
No. of years
Dummy (ratio)
Dummy (ratio)

14.76
26
0.62
0.31

14.54
24
1
0

19.47 11.73
95
0
1
0
6
0

1.27
12
0.49
0.54

1309
1309
1309
1309

99.69
96.53

Source: Authors’ estimates
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